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You Buy It, You Break It: A Comment
on Dispersing the Cloud
Aaron Perzanowski*
Personal property occupies a precarious position in the
digital marketplace. 1 In the analog world, we have relied on
stable, predictable property interests in our documents, media,
and devices to guarantee us a reasonable degree of control over
those objects and a reasonable degree of autonomy in our
interactions with them. But in our increasingly digital
environment, a cluster of interrelated developments have
conspired against meaningful property interests in the digital
stuff that makes up so much of our lives. As a result, rather than
making our own choices about how we use and dispose of those
digital objects, we often find ourselves dependent on the
permission and good will of IP rights holders, technology
platforms, and service providers.
So how did this change come about? First, as both mass
media distribution and personal record keeping shift away from
shipping and storing hardcopies to shuffling bits around the
network, the things we’ve grown accustomed to owning—physical
copies—are disappearing. As a practical matter, we stand in a
very different relationship to a file in our desk drawer than we do
to a file on a cloud server. Legal rights aside, one is in our
immediate possession and control; the other is remotely stored
and our interactions with it are mediated by third party
technology. Second, restrictive end user licenses and terms of use
intentionally undermine consumer ownership and control. Often,
those terms insist that digital goods are not sold, but merely
licensed—a declaration that is at odds with both established
consumer expectations and retailers’ own marketing claims. 2
*
1.

Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF
OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016) [hereinafter
END OF OWNERSHIP] (describing the erosion of consumer ownership).
2. See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy
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Other times, those terms grant service providers and other online
intermediaries generous rights to use, modify, monetize, and
retain user-generated content. 3 In both cases, contractual
language—often in the absence of meaningful consent—is
leveraged to shift the balance of power between individuals and
service providers who draft these typically unread and often
unreadable terms. 4 Third, digital rights management and control
over embedded software mean that, even for the physical devices
that we buy and presumably own, manufacturers can assert
ongoing control over how and even whether we can use them. 5
Even though we possess and own these physical devices, the
software that defines their operation often serves another master.
These concerns are not merely abstract or theoretical. The
past few years have shown us increasingly frequent glimpses into
a future without ownership. We see it when companies like
Autodesk use their license terms to prohibit the resale of
authorized physical copies of software. 6 We see it when Amazon
When We “Buy Now,” 165 U. PENN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017) (reporting
survey results establishing that the “Buy Now” button is deceptive for digital
media goods) (on file with author).
3. See Daniel Martin, Dispersing the Cloud: Reaffirming the Right to
Destroy in a New Era of Digital Property, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 510–11
(2017) (noting terms and conditions of various cloud providers). The public
policy exception Martin outlines to avoid the implications of these sorts of terms
is a clever one and would represent an improvement for digital consumers. Id. at
56–58. But I favor a more fundamental rethinking of digital contract formation
and enforcement that would prevent the automatic transfer of rights from
consumers to service providers. See END OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 1, at 66–70,
174–176 (describing this approach).
4. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen,
Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form
Contracts (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 195, 2014, at 22),
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1199&context=nyu_lewp (finding
that “only one or two out of every thousand retail software shoppers chooses to
access the license agreement, and those few that do spend too little time, on
average, to have read more than a small portion of the license text”).
5. See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Do You Own the
Software that Runs Your Tesla?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016 4:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-perzanowski-schultz-tesla-softwareownership-20161104-story.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (discussing how we
ended up in a “world where device makers can dictate how we use the products
we buy and reasonably believe we own”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
6. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010)
(enforcing a software license that characterized transfer of a physical copy as a
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remotely deletes ebooks—copies of George Orwell’s 1984, no
less—from the devices of its customers. 7 We see it when Keurig
coffeemakers, relying on optical sensors, refuse to brew off-brand
coffee in open mutiny against their owners. 8 We see it when John
Deere insists that farmers who pay tens of thousands of dollars
for the company’s tractors don’t own the software embedded in
them, code necessary to make even the simplest of repairs. 9 We
see it when Google-owned Nest bricks thousands of Revolv home
automation hubs simply because the company lost interest in
supporting the product. 10
And, as Daniel Martin powerfully argues, we see the erosion
of ownership when users are prevented from destroying the files
they store in the cloud. 11 Just like possession, alienation, and use,
the right to destroy fits comfortably in the bundle of rights we
license).
7. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES
(July 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18am
azon.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (“Digital books bought for the Kindle are
sent to it over a wireless network. Amazon can also use that network to
synchronize electronic books between devices—and apparently to make them
vanish.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Ted Cooper, Bad News for Keurig Green Mountain Investors:
TreeHouse Foods Says Keurig 2.0 Technology Can Be Cracked, MOTLEY FOOL
(June 23, 2014, 11:23 AM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/06/23/
bad-news-for-keurig-green-mountain-investors-treeh.aspx (last visited Feb. 20,
2017) (noting that “one of Keurig 2.0’s biggest selling points for investors is its
potential to keep unlicensed brands from using its platform”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See, e.g., Kyle Wiens, New High-Tech Farm Equipment Is a Nightmare
for Farmers, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/newhigh-tech-farm-equipment-nightmare-farmers (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) (noting
challenges faced by farmers and independent repair shops) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Darin Bartholomew, Long Comment
Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. 1201, at 6
(2015), http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class%2021/John_Deer
e_Class21_1201_2014.pdf (claiming that farmers merely had “an implied license
for the life of the vehicle to operate the vehicle”).
10. See Arlo Gilbert, The Time that Tony Fadell Sold Me a Container of
Hummus, MEDIUM (Apr. 3, 2016), https://medium.com/@arlogilbert/the-timethat-tony-fadell-sold-me-a-container-of-hummus-cb0941c762c1#.nhl96qogu (last
visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“Google is intentionally bricking hardware that I own.
They don’t even dance around it . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
11. See generally Martin, supra note 3.
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typically extend to property owners. 12 Whether we conceptualize
destruction as a freestanding right or a logical extension of the
right to exclude, a person who owns a thing can—with some
important exceptions—destroy it. 13 Businesses and individuals
destroy sensitive paper records all the time. Independent legal
obligations might caution against zealous shredding—impending
civil litigation or a criminal investigation, for example—but
otherwise, the law of property won’t intervene. Even destroying
personal property that embodies someone else’s intellectual
property is generally permitted. So if churchgoers in Alamogordo,
New Mexico, want to burn their Harry Potter books in protest
against the-boy-who-lived’s “satanic darkness,” they are free to do
so, fire codes notwithstanding. 14 Or if Canadian football fans
burn Bon Jovi albums to protest the idea of the singer relocating
the Buffalo Bills to Toronto, thereby breaching the NFL’s
northern border, the band’s record label can’t stop them. 15 U.S.
copyright law guards against destruction in only rare
circumstances, when a work of visual art is deemed one of
“recognized stature.” 16 So the Rothkos may be safe, but lots of
other valuable works are destroyed all the time. Some, like
Tibetan sand mandalas, are destroyed by their creators as part of

12. See id. at 32 (discussing the “sticks” in the bundle of property rights).
13. See id. at 18 (noting that “the right to destroy is recognized, but limited;
tolerated, but disfavored”).
14. See Sarah Hall, Harry Potter and the Sermon of Fire, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1,
2002, 6:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/01/books.harry
potter (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“As hundreds of residents opposed to the book
burning protested, several hundred worshippers listened to the church’s
founder, Pastor Jack Brock, denounce the fictional wizard as satanic, before
filing outside to toss at least 30 Potter books into the flames.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Jason MacNeil, Toronto Argonauts Fans Burn Bon Jovi Albums to
Protest a NFL Team in Canada, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/08/18/toronto-argonauts-burn-bon-jovialbums_n_5688608.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (reporting that
“approximately 15 fans of the Canadian Football League’s Toronto Argonauts
showed their venom towards the rock star by lighting a handful of CDs”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See 17 U.S.C. §106A(a)(3)(B) (2016) (providing the author of a work of
visual art with the right “to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a
violation of that right”).
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the creative process. 17 Others, like the collection of graffiti at
5Pointz in New York City, are destroyed by real property owners
who prefer new development to preservation. 18
As Martin notes, courts have expressed the greatest
skepticism of the right to destroy when it comes to real
property. 19 In those cases, the worry was couched in terms of
waste and its broader impact on society. Despite Blackstone’s
most famous quote, property rights are not absolute. 20 And
there’s nothing inherently inappropriate about courts taking into
account the impact of a property owner’s exercise of her rights on
her neighbors, many of whom have property interests of their
own at stake. Crucially, though, those courts were asked to
permit the destruction of property in accordance with a deceased
property owner’s will, as in Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co. 21
This form of dead hand destruction strikes many courts as
particularly inappropriate and, unlike the wishes of a living,
breathing property owner, particularly easy to disregard. But if
Mrs. Johnston, the decedent in Eyerman, had decided to raze her
home the day before she died, few courts would have stopped her
on the basis of waste. Even if courts did routinely prevent living
owners from tearing down their homes, the rationales that would
support such restrictions on the right of destruction, Martin
convincingly argues, do not apply to digital files. 22 Digital files
are easily reproduced; they are rarely unique or uniquely
valuable; and their destruction does not typically visit collateral
harm on others.

17. See SUSAN I. BUCHALTER, MANDALA SYMBOLISM AND TECHNIQUES:
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR PROFESSIONALS 11 (2012) (discussing the Tibetan
works of art).
18. See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (noting the destruction of works of arguably recognized stature at
5Pointz).
19. See Martin, supra note 3, at 13–15 (discussing cases in which courts
refuse to enforce a property owner’s desire to destroy her own real property).
20. Id. at 10 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2).
21. 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (refusing to uphold the will of
the decedent, Louise Woodruff Johnston, by instructing the testator to destroy
her home).
22. See Martin, supra note 3, at 40–42 (arguing that digital property
cannot be wasted in the same sense as real, or even physical, property).
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Martin offers a timely and persuasive case for reinvigorating
the right to destroy digital files in the cloud. As more of our
digital lives are stored on “somebody else’s computer,” 23 users
who want to retain and assert some control over the use of the
documents and data they upload would benefit from a right to
eliminate cloud copies. But the right to destroy is part of a larger
set of questions about the role digital intangible property should
play in our networked present and future. To tie Martin’s
insights into that broader conversation, I want to elaborate
further on one question addressed in Dispersing the Cloud—the
nature and legal status of property rights in digital assets.
How should we conceptualize a property interest in a digital
file stored in the cloud? Our natural instinct might be to
analogize to other, more familiar scenarios. One could be forgiven
for thinking of cloud storage as a mere extension of our local
devices, not all that different from external hard drives. The user
interfaces of popular cloud services like Dropbox, Box, and Google
Drive encourage this misconception. If you install their desktop
applications, they create a local folder that syncs with your cloud
account. You can add, move, and edit files exactly as you would
with purely local ones. And you delete them the same way as
well, by dragging them to the trash icon on your desktop, for
example. This interface choice may well lull users into a false
sense of security, leading them to believe that they have as much
control over cloud copies as they do local ones. But as Martin
explains, that isn’t the case. 24 For local copies, you own and
possess the physical medium in which those copies are stored.
But you certainly don’t own Dropbox’s servers even though your
files are stored on them.
An analogy to a different instance of remotely-stored
property might be more useful. Maybe your cloud file is more like
a family heirloom in a safe deposit box. You don’t own the box or
23. See Danny Palmer, We Should Replace the Word ‘Cloud’ with
‘Somebody Else's Computer’, Says Security Expert, COMPUTING (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2316368/we-should-replace-the-wordcloud-with-somebody-elses-computer-says-security-expert (last visited Feb. 20,
2017) (noting that security expert Graham Cluley suggests “replacing all
instances of the word ‘cloud’ with ‘somebody else’s computer’”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. See Martin, supra note 3, at 53 (explaining that the servers that make
up “the cloud” do not belong to users of cloud services).
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the bank in which it is stored, but you do own the contents. Just
like grandpa’s stamp collection, perhaps you own the files even if
you don’t currently possess them. But this analogy, too, has its
limits. There’s no obligation for the bank to destroy the contents
of your safe deposit box upon request; the bank does not make
routine copies of the contents of safe deposit boxes in the course
of normal operations; nor does the bank require you to grant it
the right to retain copies of your heirlooms as a condition for
renting the box in the first place. But perhaps the most
significant distinction has to do with the nature of the thing
owned. The stamp collection is tangible personal property, subject
to well established common law doctrines; your files on the cloud
are something potentially quite different.
As Martin acknowledges, the existence of digital intangible
property rights in cloud-based assets is uncertain. 25 In large part,
that uncertainty is a function of the intangible nature of the
assets at issue. In Blackstone’s era, the dominant view of
property imagined a legal right to control a thing. The twentieth
century saw a shift in our thinking about property that embraced
the idea of property regulating relationships between people
rather than an owner’s relationship to a thing. 26 Under that more
modern view, the thing—the res—became far less important to
our conception of property; the existence of a property right does
not depend on a particular tangible object. 27 Nonetheless, most
familiar examples of property rights are still tied to tangible
things.
There are exceptions of course. The quasi-property rights
created by copyright and patent law are examples. But they are
also something of a special case. Confronted with a public goods
problem that could lead to the undersupply of creative works,
Congress crafted statutory exclusive rights in intangible
creations. IP protection is not a function of the common law; it is
25. See id. at 19–23 (addressing the question of how the law defines digital
property).
26. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710 (1917)
(discussing legal conceptions of property throughout the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries).
27. Of course, this is a necessarily cursory overview of a long-running
debate in property law.
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a statutory creature. But IP is not the only example. The law
recognizes other forms of intangible property, ranging from
securities to government franchises like liquor licences and taxi
medallions. Some of those forms of intangible property have deep
common law roots; others are the product of more recent
legislative action.
The question is whether courts will embrace property rights
in the sorts of intangible digital assets consumers store in the
cloud. Today, there is little clear precedent for such digital
intangible property. But efforts to carve out consumer property
rights in digital assets are underway. At least in Europe, as
Martin notes, there have been promising signs. 28 Courts there
have recognized that consumers are entitled to resell digital
goods they buy, even when those goods are delivered digitally. So,
for example, when Oracle sued UsedSoft for allowing users to
purchase secondhand digitally-downloaded software, the court
held that since the software was originally purchased lawfully
from Oracle, the consumers owned it and could dispose of it, even
though they didn’t own any particular tangible copy. 29 Instead,
they owned and could alienate their intangible right to download
and use the software. 30 Likewise, a Dutch court held that lawfully
acquired ebooks could be resold despite the fact that rights to
intangible assets rather than particular copies of the books were
changing hands. 31
In the United States, however, the picture has not been quite
so promising. 32 When a company called ReDigi launched a similar
28. See Martin, supra note 3, at 22–23 (noting that, “according to the
European Court of Justice, there is ‘no difference whether the copy of the
computer program was made available by means of a download or on a
DVD/CD-ROM’” (citing Michael S. Richardson, Comment, The Monopoly on
Digital Distribution, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 168
(2014))).
29. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I0000, at ¶ 89.
30. Id.
31. See
generally
Rb.
Den
Haag,
3
september
2014,
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:10962, IEF 14164 (VOB/ Stichting Leenrecht e.a.)
(Neth.), available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:10962;
Hof
Amsterdam,
20
januari
2015,
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:66,
NUV/Tom
Kabinet
(Neth.),
available
at
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:66.
32. In one positive development, states have started to take the notion of
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resale marketplace for lawfully purchased digital music, it was
promptly sued by Capitol Records. 33 Copyright law’s first sale
doctrine, of course, recognizes consumer property rights in the
tangible copies they own. 34 But because of the digital nature of
the purchases and subsequent transfers, ReDigi users weren’t
selling physical copies; they were alienating an intangible asset—
namely, the legal right to download and use the purchased music.
As the ReDigi opinion makes clear, current copyright doctrine is
not well positioned to take these sorts of rights in digital assets
into account. While copyrights are themselves rights in
intangibles, the framework for mediating the competing rights of
consumers and creators is built around ownership of physical
copies. 35 Working within that framework, the district court found
that ReDigi’s platform did not facilitate lawful transfers, but
infringing acts of reproduction and distribution. 36 The case is
currently on appeal to the Second Circuit, so there is still hope of
bringing U.S. law into alignment with its more enlightened
European counterpart on the question of meaningful property
rights in intangible digital assets.
Regardless of the case’s ultimate outcome, ReDigi illustrates
some of the challenges for robust digital property rights. The first
is the difficulty of identifying the thing, whether tangible or
digital assets seriously. See Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital
Accounts Act, 79 Del. Laws, c. 416, § 1 (2014) (providing, among other things,
that end-user license agreement provisions that limit a fiduciary's access to a
digital asset or digital account of an account holder are generally void as against
public policy); NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT 1 (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014_UFADA
A_Final.pdf (recommending a uniform statute that would “vest fiduciaries with
the authority to access, control, or copy digital assets and accounts”).
33. See generally Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2016) (providing that “the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord”).
35. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Personal and
Intellectual Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1253–55 (2015) (arguing
that exhaustion need not rely on the existence of a physical copy).
36. See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 660–61 (granting “Capitol's motion for
summary judgment on its claims for ReDigi's direct, contributory, and vicarious
infringement of its distribution and reproduction rights”)
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intangible, that the user owns. If consumers have property rights
in cloud-based assets, what exactly is it that they own? It’s easy
to conceptualize a consumer owning a physical copy. It is a thing
we can see and hold. Even digital copies exist in physical form,
whether on a local drive or a remote server. But a property
interest in a digital asset—whether for purposes of alienation or
destruction—is not just a right in a particular copy stored in a
particular medium. The right to delete or transfer a particular
physical copy is not a very valuable one in a networked
environment, where copies are plentiful. Instead, digital
intangible property must give the owner the right to control the
disposition of files or data that may be embodied in multiple
copies, stored in different places, and created at different times.
To the extent they transcend particular copies, property
rights in intangible assets look a bit like IP rights. Those rights
are not defined primarily by physical identity, but by
informational content. For IP rights holders, the thing they own
is the intangible creation—original expression in the case of
copyright or a novel invention in the case of patent. Rights in
those intangible things are implicated, if not necessarily
infringed, whenever others make specified uses that reflect the
underlying informational content of their expression or
invention. 37
Advocates for this new form of digital intangible property
envision a set of rights that are broader than traditional personal
property rights because they aren’t entombed in a particular
tangible object. At the same time, they are narrower than IP
rights because they don’t extend to every instantiation of the
underlying informational content. To illustrate the difference,
let’s think about the analog world first. Let’s say Alice buys a
copy of Julien Baker’s album Sprained Ankle on vinyl. Alice owns
the copy, and her property right is tied to that object. By virtue of
her ownership, Alice can sell her copy and the legal rights
associated with it to Bob. But her ownership of that copy doesn’t
entitle her to pick up other copies wherever she finds them, claim
them as her own, and sell them. In contrast, the copyright in
37. In copyright law, independent creation is not infringement regardless of
similarity of expression. But in patent law, even an independent inventor is an
infringer.
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Sprained Ankle extends to every copy of the record, regardless of
who owns it. 38
Now let’s say Alice, rather than buying a vinyl record, buys
the album in a digital format. The copyright continues to apply to
all copies of Sprained Ankle, but Alice’s rights take on a
somewhat different form. If Alice has digital intangible property
rights, she could transfer her rights to the digital music she
purchased. But, crucially, those rights are not tied to any
particular copy of the record. In fact, Alice could sell her digital
property to Bob without transferring a copy at all. Instead, Alice’s
access to copies stored on a cloud server would be terminated, and
Bob’s access would be enabled. It’s the transfer of legal rights
rather than the copy that is key. Just as in the analog world,
Alice’s ownership of Sprained Ankle as a digital asset does not
mean she can claim and transfer Charlie’s rights to Sprained
Ankle simply because they both bought the same record. Alice’s
rights may not be tied to a particular tangible copy, but they are
still limited in scope; in this case, they are defined by her initial
purchase. The same would be true for the right to destroy. Alice
would be entitled to delete a range of copies that are in some
sense hers, but not necessarily every copy that reflects similar or
even identical information.
This discussion points to a second challenge for digital
intangible property—resolving the tension between competing
property interests. As these examples show, there are often
multiple, distinct owners and interests at stake when we talk
about property. So the cloud server may be Amazon’s personal
property, the digital assets it contains may belong to a number of
consumers, and the copyrights in the works those files represent
are the IP of an even larger set of rights holders. Precisely how
those rights interact—when each must yield to the other—is a
crucial question in developing a workable set of property
interests. When it comes to the interaction between IP and
personal property, the exhaustion principle has successfully
mediated that relationship for well over a century. 39 And while
38. Some of those rights, notably the exclusive right of distribution, are
exhausted upon transfer of the copy to a new owner. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2016)
(codifying the exhaustion doctrine).
39. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 35, at 1212 (“[E]xhaustion is an
inherent part of copyright law's balance between the rights of creators and the

538

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (2017)

exhaustion, as a general principle, offers a useful guide for
defining the relationship between IP and digital intangible
property, the details are crucial in order to strike an appropriate
balance between consumer rights and creative incentives. 40
Since the right to destroy focuses largely on control over
user-created data, Martin is able to deftly sidestep the
complications that arise from conflicts between IP and digital
intangible property, though that won’t be the case in every
instance. By directing our focus to an area where digital assets
matter but are not fraught with IP implications, Martin is
advancing the debate in a potentially fruitful direction. 41
Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the rights of owners of
personal property, like servers, may conflict with those of digital
asset owners. 42 An absolute right to delete digital assets may well
impose an unreasonable burden on service providers. There are
lots of ways this balance between the interests of owners of
servers and digital assets might be struck. The broader point is
that the introduction of new property rights requires us to think
through their implications for the web of existing property
interests. When it comes to the right to destroy, Dispersing the
Cloud provides a valuable foundation for just that conversation.

rights of the public. It is a fundamental component of almost every intellectual
property system.”).
40. See END OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 1, at 180–85 (describing the
considerations that courts should give to various consumer rights).
41. Delaware’s Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital Accounts Act
made a similar move when it limited transfers “to the extent permitted
under . . . any end user license agreement.” Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets
and Digital Accounts Act, 79 Del. Laws c. 416, § 5004.
42. See Martin, supra note 3, at 52 (addressing why digital property owners
should be able “to wrest control over their data from the hands of cloud
providers” (emphasis added)).

